



Argentina continues to struggle with inflation, foreign debt, and deficit.
The latest effort, the recently announced "Plan Primavera," continues to
rely on some old standby remedies. These include agreements with in-
dustrialists to hold on prices (but no space controls, and reference prices
above market prices), a call for employment reduction in government
companies, and continuing efforts to privatize government-owned com-
panies. The latter, in particular are controversial.
One element of the Plan Primavera may be of greater interest to the
international business community, because it affects prices of exports to
and from Argentina. Under current exchange rules, there are two ex-
change rates, the commercial and the financial. Dollars are more expen-
sive in austral terms at the financial rate. Australs are more expensive in
dollar terms at the commercial rate. The current spread between the two
rates is about 20 percent.
Under current export rules, an Argentine exporter is required to sell
for foreign currency, and to repatriate that foreign currency to Argentina
and sell it to the government for australs. The exchange rate is either the
commercial rate (for most traditional exports) or a fifty-fifty mix of the
commercial and financial rates (for most industrial goods). Conversely,
an Argentine importer generally can purchase foreign currency from the
government to pay for imported goods only at the financial rate (with a
few exceptions, e.g., fuel oil). The government thus has put itself in the
enviable position of buying low (cheap dollars from exporters) and selling
high (expensive dollars to importers). The spread is expected to cover
something on the order of two percent of GNP.
II. Brazil
The most significant recent legal developments in Brazil are: (a) the
enactment of legislation liberalizing trade and domestic industrial policies
(the New Industrial Policy); and (b) the enactment of legislation creating
preferred export zones in certain areas of Brazil (Export Zones).
A. NEW INDUSTRIAL POLICY
The New Industrial Policy is reflected primarily in Decree-Laws Nos.
2433 and 2434, both of May 19, 1988. These Decree-Laws contain new
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rules regarding: (1) establishment of new industrial sectorial projects ap-
proved by the "Conselho de Desenvolvimento Industrial" (CDI-Indus-
trial Development Council); (2) tax incentives for research and development
implemented under the rules for a "Programa de Desenvolvimento Tec-
nologico Industrial" (Technological-Industrial Development Program); (3)
restatement of the tax and financial benefits available to industrial com-
panies established under Brazilian law pursuant to the "Befiex" program
(Beneficios Fiscais a Exportacao-Export Tax Benefits); and (4) tariff
reductions for most products.
The CDI (a governmental agency under the Ministry of Industry and
Commerce) is empowered to grant import tariff reductions for machinery
and equipment that are to be fixed assets (up to 90 percent reduction),
raw materials (up to 80 percent reduction), and accelerated asset depre-
ciation for approved projects. To qualify, applicants must fulfill certain
commitments and prerequisites aimed, for example, to improve compe-
tition within the industrial sector, eliminate bottlenecks, and improve the
use of human resources.
Companies qualifying under a Technological-Industrial Development
Program will be entitled to: (1) deduction of research and development
expenses for Brazilian income tax purposes; (2) duty reduction (up to 90
percent) on imports of raw materials and components; (3) accelerated
depreciation for machinery and equipment; (4) income tax credits and
reductions based on royalties paid to obtain new technology; and (5)
deduction for income tax purposes of royalties paid for "high technology"
or capital goods, provided the royalties do not exceed 10 percent of sales.
Industrial companies wishing to qualify for the Befiex program must
assume an export commitment (measured in U.S. dollars), generally over
a ten-year period. During that period the industrial company must main-
tain a yearly positive balance of payments favorable to Brazil. In ex-
change, the industrial company is granted: (I) import duty exemption or
reduction for equipment, machinery, apparatuses, raw materials, parts,
and components up to an overall U.S. dollar ceiling agreed upon by the
Company and Befiex; (2) extended income tax loss carryforward privi-
leges (six years, versus the normal four years); and (3) accelerated de-
preciation for machinery and equipment. The Befiex program is
administered by a separate agency within the Ministry of Industry and
Commerce.
In addition to the above "special" programs, most companies doing
business in Brazil will benefit from the tariff reductions and other trade
liberalization measures. These include practical elimination of the so-
called "similarity" test (except for certain sectors of the computer in-
dustry and for companies qualifying for special government programs,
e.g., Befiex), whereby importation of goods "similar" to those manufac-
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tured in Brazil was effectively precluded. In addition, the "I.O.F." tax
(Imposto sobre Operacoes Financeiras-Tax on Financial Transactions)
applied on a Brazilian importer's payment to a foreign exporter was elim-
inated. I.O.F. rates range from 10 percent to 25 percent of the value of
the transaction.
B. EXPORT ZONES
Decree-Law No. 2452, enacted on July 29, 1988, empowers the Brazilian
executive power to grant to qualifying companies in Brazil the right to
establish operations within certain export zones. These export zones are
expected to be established in the Amazon and in Northeast Brazil. Au-
thorization to establish operations within an export zone will be granted
for a twelve-year period. The period will be renewable for equal successive
periods.
Qualifying industrial companies will enjoy: (1) full duty exemption; (2)
exemption from I.O.F. tax (for insurance, currency exchange, and ne-
gotiable instruments transactions); (3) supplemental income tax levied on
excess dividend distributions to shareholders domiciled outside Brazil;
and (4) social security and some other fee reductions. In exchange for
such benefits, the company must, inter alia: (1) commit to export all of
its output; (2) refrain from obtaining local credit; and (3) fulfill minimum
requirements regarding capital and local expenditures.
The applicant will fail to qualify if the products targeted for export are
already exported by another company operating in Brazil, unless the
applicant can demonstrate that the new exports will be "in addition to"
(measured in U.S. dollar terms) existing exports.
II. Chile
In the months leading up to the October 1988 presidential plebiscite, po-
litical events overshadowed legal developments in Chile. Nevertheless,
some legislative changes are of interest to companies during business in
Chile. Consistent with the government's economic strategy of reducing the
overall tax burden on business, the basic import tariff was reduced from
20 percent to 15 percent in January, the withholding tax on profit remitt-
ances was reduced from 40 percent to 35 percent effective April 1, and the
general VAT rate was reduced from 20 percent to 16 percent in June.
In addition, the Chilean Central Bank further refined and expanded the
debt-to-equity conversion program, pursuant to which Chilean sovereign
debt is acquired from foreign creditors and converted into equity in Chi-
lean companies. One of the first and most successful of the many debt-
to-equity swap regimes established in Latin America, the Chilean program
has two parts, one for national investors and the other for foreign investors.
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Regarding the national program, in March and May of 1988 the Central
Bank adopted a series of resolutions that, in effect, allow Chilean home-
owners to utilize debt equity swaps to acquire pesos at a bargain price to
pay installments on their residential mortgages. Since the maximum ben-
efit available to an individual mortgagor is U.S. $6,000, this program will
not significantly reduce Chile's multibillion dollar foreign debt. According
to some commentators, however, it may win favor for the current gov-
ernment with an important part of the voting population.
Regarding the foreign program, in April 1988 the Central Bank pro-
mulgated regulations that clarify the procedures for effecting investments
in Chilean investment companies by means of debt-to-equity conversions.
IV. Colombia
Important tax changes were introduced in Colombia at the end of 1987
and during the first half of 1988. Procedural changes came first. Most were
aimed at tax avoidance. Prior rules required that taxpayers submit sub-
stantial supporting documentation together with their tax returns. These
requirements were largely eliminated. Instead, taxpayers are to retain
records supporting their tax returns for a period of five years, and the
tax administration is free to inspect those records at any time. The tax
authorities were also given greater access to information regarding bank,
stock exchange, notarial, and other transactions. Finally in this regard,
sanctions were stiffened, with penalties, inter alia, for failure to file, failure
to supply information when requested, and failure to issue invoices com-
plying with specific requirements.
The most significant change from a practical point of view, however,
which affects virtually everyone in Colombia, is liberalizing rather than
restrictive. The legislation entirely eliminated the use of tax clearance
certificates (certificados de paz y salvo), which had been required in order
to engage in a broad range of transactions and activities.
Foreigners were benefited by a May 13, 1988, reduction in tax rates.
Decree 925/88 reduced the income tax withholding rate on dividends paid
by Colombian companies to foreign investors in those companies from
30 percent to 25 percent, and totally eliminated the tax for capitalized
dividends. The reduction is matched by an equivalent 30 percent to 25
percent reduction in the remittance tax rate on branch profits. Both the
income tax withholding rate on dividends and the remittance tax rate on
branch profits will reduce to 20 percent for 1989 and thereafter.
V. Mexico
Much has changed recently regarding foreign investments in Mexico.
As many may recall, when the Foreign Investment Law was first enacted
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in 1973, and for many years thereafter, it was very strictly enforced. One
hundred percent foreign ownership was only freely available for compa-
nies that were already foreign-owned at the time the law was enacted,
and for "maquiladoras." But even those majority foreign-owned com-
panies were very limited in what they could do. In general they had to
secure the authorization of the foreign investment authorities to do any-
thing other than what they were doing before. New foreign investment
had to take a minority position in any Mexican company, with Mexican
partners holding at least 51 percent (60 percent in some fields) of the
capital. New foreign majority participation typically required prior ap-
proval of the Foreign Investment Commission, which was seldom granted.
Today, the law remains in effect as originally enacted. It has never been
amended. What has changed is the manner of its implementation. It is
now easier to obtain approvals. The authorities are much more willing to
approve a majority foreign investment, at least one that fits into Mexico's
development scheme. Experience has shown that the floodgates are not
open. The Mexican Government knows what it wants, what it needs and,
more importantly, what it can afford to do politically. Foreign investment
still is a particularly sensitive area.
The reason for the liberalization is not mere magnanimity on the part
of the authorities. The push for liberalization is largely a result of the
economic difficulties that Mexico has been experiencing. The government
has come to realize that opening up foreign investment is one vehicle for
overcoming these problems. To a large extent it has identified the factors
that presumably will contribute to resolving, or at least ameliorating,
Mexico's situation.
What will sell a majority foreign investment to the government, and to
the public? Experience has shown that the most important factors include:
(1) generation of foreign currency; (2) export potential; (3) new job cre-
ation; (4) size of the investment; (5) sophistication of the new technology
involved; (6) local resource use; and (7) location of the company. In short,
the prospective majority foreign investment must generate foreign cur-
rency, jobs, and development. To obtain approval for a majority foreign
investment, the applicant must present the authorities with a package that
provides for as many of the above factors as possible, and any others that
would be attractive to the Mexican Government given its current objectives.
The package must also be realistic, however. A pattern has evolved
whereby the authorities demand concrete commitments based on the ap-
plicant's representations in its foreign investment application. Contrary
to past practice, the authorities no longer are attempting to extract com-
mitments far beyond what the foreign investor proposes, but they are
demanding that the applicant stand by the representations made in its
application.
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Another important point to bear in mind is that the authorities should
be consulted prior to the filing of an application. The best way to proceed
is for the applicant's attorneys or other outside representatives to discuss
the proposal with the authorities in advance, in general terms and on a
no-name basis, to test the waters. Based on these discussions, the
applicant will be in a position to refine the proposal and make it even
more attractive. At some point during this process the identify of the
foreign investor can be revealed to the authorities, thus bringing into
play the reputation, financial strength, and other positive characteristics
of the foreign investor. Based on these discussions the final application
can be prepared and the investor will have a very good idea of how the
people who will be critically important in evaluating it will react, and
what their recommendation to the Foreign Investment Commission is
likely to be.
VI. Panama
An interesting offshoot of the political crisis in Panama is likely to keep
Panamanian and international jurists busy for years to come. That is the
question of the legality of certain legislation enacted in Panama after the
de facto removal from office of President Eric Arturo Delvalle on February
26, 1988. The procedures by which the Panamanian Legislature removed
Delvalle from office and the Council of Ministers designated Manual Solis
Palma as "Minister in Charge of the Presidency" are of questionable
validity under Panama's Constitution. Consequently, all of the decrees
issued by Solis Palma may be subject to legal challenge. These include,
for example, various measures promulgated to counteract President Rea-
gan's Executive Order of April 6, 1988, including decrees purporting to
extend tax payment deadlines, to change tax withholding agents, and to
extend the maturity of government checks.
Of equal interest is the validity of the various governmental acts taken
by Mr. Delvalle after his de facto removal from office. For example, on
June 17, 1988, the Panamanian Ambassador to the United States signed
on behalf of Mr. Delvalle, as President of the Republic, an Executive
Decree purporting to terminate the effect of a previous decree issued by
Mr. Solis Palma relating to the timing of payment of fiscal obligations to
the Panamanian Government. The validity of Mr. Delvalle's executive
decree, of course, also depends on the legality of the legislative act that
purported to remove him from office.
When the political crisis comes to an end, and regardless of whether
the Noriega forces or the opposition emerges victorious, it may be ex-
pected that one or more of the decrees issued by Solis Palma or Delvalle
will be subject to legal challenge.
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VII. Peru
By Supreme Decree No. 127-88-EF of August 8, 1988, the Peruvian
Government extended until December 31, 1988, the prohibition contained
in Supreme Decree No. 260-86-EF of August 1986 (discussed in the Winter
1987 edition of The International Lawyer), of all remittances of capital,
profits, and royalties from Peru. The decree requires that all amounts
distributed by Peruvian companies as capital, profits, or royalties be de-
posited with the Central Bank, in exchange for obligations of the Peruvian
Government denominated in foreign currency.
VIII. Venezuela
Legal developments in Venezuela thus far in 1988 have been overshad-
owed by the presidential election campaigns. Nevertheless certain new
legislation is worthy of mention. In January 1988, the Congress enacted
Venezuela's first Law of Protection of Constitutional Rights and Guar-
anties (Ley Organica de Amparo sobre Derechos y Garantias Constitu-
cionales, G.O. No. 33,891, January 22, 1988). The law provides a procedural
framework for the prompt redress of infringements of rights that are rec-
ognized in the Venezuelan Constitution but that, due to the absence of
specific legislative provisions, have heretofore been difficult to assert by
legal action. Because the law makes available a significant new cause of
action that may be utilized to remedy a broad range of grievances in an
expeditious proceeding, it is expected that legal actions under the new
law will proliferate. Indeed, numerous actions have been filed and judg-
ments issued at the time of this writing.
In February 1988, the Congress enacted a major reform of the General
Law of Banks and Other Credit Institutions. Although a detailed analysis
of the amendments is beyond the scope of this report, the general thrust
of the legislation is to vest in the Central Bank and the Superintendency
of Banks greater regulatory control over the banking industry. The most
widely cited purpose for the increased level of regulation is that of avoiding
major bank failures of the kind witnessed in the early years of this decade.
As expected, the Congress finally ratified both the Protocol Amending
the Cartegena Agreement (May 15, 1988) and Decision No. 220 of the
Commission of the Cartegena Agreement (July 25, 1988), thus giving each
the force of internal Venezuelan law. As reported earlier, in the Spring
1988 issue of The International Lawyer, Decision No. 220 replaces De-
cision No. 24, as the common Andean Pact foreign investment law and
relaxes many of the previous restrictions on foreign investment. Vene-
zuela's formal adoption of Decision No. 220 is largely anticlimactic, be-
cause most of the major changes contained therein were already
implemented in Venezuela's amended foreign investment regulations, De-
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